CVE-2023-47122

{"id": "CVE-2023-47122", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "[email protected]", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 4.2, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 3.6, "exploitabilityScore": 0.5}, {"type": "Primary", "source": "[email protected]", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.3, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 3.6, "exploitabilityScore": 1.6}]}, "published": "2023-11-10T22:15:14.250", "references": [{"url": "https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model", "tags": ["Product"], "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/commit/cd66ccb03c86a3600955f0c15f6bfeb75f697236", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/security/advisories/GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc", "tags": ["Patch", "Vendor Advisory"], "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model", "tags": ["Product"], "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"}, {"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/commit/cd66ccb03c86a3600955f0c15f6bfeb75f697236", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"}, {"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"}, {"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/security/advisories/GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc", "tags": ["Patch", "Vendor Advisory"], "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"}], "vulnStatus": "Modified", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "[email protected]", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-347"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Gitsign es un software para la firma Git sin llave mediante Sigstore. En las versiones de gitsign que comienzan con 0.6.0 y anteriores a 0.8.0, las claves p\u00fablicas de Rekor se obtuvieron a trav\u00e9s de la API de Rekor, en lugar de a trav\u00e9s del cliente TUF local. Si el servidor Rekor ascendente estuviera comprometido, los clientes de gitsign podr\u00edan ser enga\u00f1ados para que conf\u00eden en firmas incorrectas. No se conoce ning\u00fan compromiso con la instancia de bien p\u00fablico predeterminada (`rekor.sigstore.dev`): cualquiera que use esta instancia no se ve afectado. Este problema se solucion\u00f3 en v0.8.0. No hay workarounds conocidos disponibles."}], "lastModified": "2024-11-21T08:29:49.413", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:gitsign:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "438E0CC3-D374-42A0-B324-2887AB9A8328", "versionEndExcluding": "0.8.0", "versionStartIncluding": "0.6.0"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]"}