Vulnerabilities (CVE)

For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see: https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs). The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata (e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to mo ... For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see: https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs). The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata (e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another host). Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata. The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order) each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and is restored from. In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner, and should not be trusted by the host administrator. A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata backup. A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc.

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XAPI open file limit DoS It is possible for an unauthenticated client on the network to cause XAPI to hit its file-descriptor limit. This causes XAPI to be unable to accept new requests for other (trusted) clients, and blocks XAPI from carrying out any tasks that require the opening of file descriptors.

An issue was discovered in Xen XAPI before 2020-12-15. Certain xenstore keys provide feedback from the guest, and are therefore watched by toolstack. Specifically, keys are watched by xenopsd, and data are forwarded via RPC through message-switch to xapi. The watching logic in xenopsd sends one RPC update containing all data, any time any single xenstore key is updated, and therefore has O(N^2) time complexity. Furthermore, message-switch retains recent (currently 128) RPC messages for diagnosti ... An issue was discovered in Xen XAPI before 2020-12-15. Certain xenstore keys provide feedback from the guest, and are therefore watched by toolstack. Specifically, keys are watched by xenopsd, and data are forwarded via RPC through message-switch to xapi. The watching logic in xenopsd sends one RPC update containing all data, any time any single xenstore key is updated, and therefore has O(N^2) time complexity. Furthermore, message-switch retains recent (currently 128) RPC messages for diagnostic purposes, yielding O(M*N) space complexity. The quantity of memory a single guest can monopolise is bounded by xenstored quota, but the quota is fairly large. It is believed to be in excess of 1G per malicious guest. In practice, this manifests as a host denial of service, either through message-switch thrashing against swap, or OOMing entirely, depending on dom0's configuration. (There are no quotas in xenopsd to limit the quantity of keys that result in RPC traffic.) A buggy or malicious guest can cause unreasonable memory usage in dom0, resulting in a host denial of service. All versions of XAPI are vulnerable. Systems that are not using the XAPI toolstack are not vulnerable.

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